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I. Approach
When comparing the theory of international relations and the science 
of international law, we have to be aware of the assignment we undertake 
This is illustrated by the graph below.
The level of the sci­
entific apprehension 
of both the primary 
reality and the nor­
mative level reflec­
ting reality
The level of the ref­
lection of primary 
reality, at the same 
time the normative 
level aimed at sha­
ping primary reality
Altogether six intereffects, contacts oxist between the four elements 
of the graph. From among them, this study concentrates on No. 1, it 
sheds light on the difference between No. 2 and 3, and refers to No. 5 and G.
The level of the prac­
tical primary real­
ity, deeds, events
The theory of international relations and the science of international 
law can be compared if they are homogeneous forms of consciousness. 
Their homogeneity may be that they are both sciences or that neither of 
them are.
With regard to both fields, doubt emerged concerning their scientific 
nature. During the history of the theory of international relations, in the 
debate between the traditionalists and'scientists (modernists), the tradi­
tionalists doubted whether that what the scientists are entering into can 
be regarded as science. The answer of the scientists was to put a question 
mark against the operation of the traditionalists.1 Although since then the 
dispute calmed down, the problem behind it has not been solved: there 
is no unanimously approved definition of what is science and what is the 
method of scientific cognition.2
The science of international law, moreover, the entire legal science 
struggles ir. the same way concerning its own scientific character and several 
of its representativas deny that legal science would be a science.3
As textbooks and periodicals are still published independently from 
the science theoretical answer to be given to the question raised, I will 
call the theory of international relations and the science of international 
law science.
In this case, another question emerges. What should be regarded as the 
standpoint of science in a given question?
In the theory of international relations there are practically no 
generally approved theses which would not be debated by at least one 
major school. It is easier to find such in the science of international law — 
if somebody is cautious enough and does not dig too deeply into the pro­
fessional literature.
Consequently, the theory of international relations as a whole canno- 
be compared with the science of international law as a whole —with scientit 
fic precision. Neither can one separate the two from each other. However - 
it can be done in practice if one combines the various views which emerged, 
in the given science into a uniform series of statements through a brutally 
grandiose simplification. After this, some of the usual questions of the 
comparison of the two branches of science can be raised.4
— what is their subject?
— what is their methodolgy ?
— what are their functions?
This paper supplements the above questions with an additional one:
— what values are they carrying, and what are they evaluating?
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II. Subject
The mutual starting point: both analyze the relations between soci­
eties organised into states. Observing the question more closely, we find 
that through its certain branches the theory of international relations 
takes into consideration the processes within the state. I t deals with 
smaller units than the state — parties, classes, public opinion, organisations, 
and individuals — thus „entering the billiard ball“ .
Up to now the science of international law has been concentrating 
on interstate relations, it analyzes interstate negotiations and the resulting 
— or abortive — agreements, as well as the customary law existing bet­
ween states and ignores what preceded and what follows the brith of an 
international agreement within the state organisation. At best it mentions 
through what legal mechanisms the state achieves the application of the 
international legal rules in the domestic law.
An illustrative example: in connection with the dissolution of the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the emergence of the independent 
Czechoslovak state, the science of international law does not deal with 
the reasons for the First World War, with the gloomy Czech and Slovak 
history, nor with the political consequences of the dissolution. I t  is only 
interested in the conditions under which the assets, obligations and rights 
are transferred to Czechoslovakia, as to one of the successor states of the 
monarchy.
The other basic difference in the analysis of the relations between 
societies is that the theory of international relations pays great attention 
to the relations between non-state actors which appear in the international 
arena. The science of international law only deals with the legal relations 
between the subjects of international law. However, the subjects of inter­
national law can only be states, intergovernmental international organisa­
tions (there are no more than 450 of such in the entire world) and peoples. 
The contacts between the conventional organisations of the society and 
the economy, companies and social organisations (based on individual 
participation) theoretically are not the subjects of the science of inter­
national law.
Occasionally, legal science steps over its own frontiers and analyzes 
regulations which are not qualified as law like the 1975 Helsinki Final 
Act, the different codes of conduct for transnational corporations 
or the 1974 UN General Assembly documents about the new international 
economic order. Such regulations are usually described as soft law.5 In this 
connection, the science of international law blends with the theory of 
international relations to such an extent that it is forced (and willing) 
to concentrate on factors which are on this side of the law and beyond 
the law: the political aims of states, the motivations of the political deci­
sion makers, the international economic order, the motivating interests, 
and the desired values and/or targets.
However, such impulses in legal science are exceptional. Usually the 
scholar analyzes the provisions of international law. Most international
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legal works have no other aim than to interpret the text of agreements, the 
judgements formulating customary, law, scholar papers, and government 
documents.0 I t may eventually introduce the history of their origin, 
reformulate the provisions in an everyday — or scientific — language, 
and compare them to each other, with the prototypes and with the desired 
alternatives. Thus, legal science regards the law, the provisions of law as 
its subjects.7 Deeds carried out in primary reality, the steps and omissions 
of the states are considered to be stemming from the law in the eyes of 
legal science. Whether the subject of the international law adheres to 
or violates the rule, the scholar of international law will aproach the 
conduct from the side of the rule. Only the birth of a a new rule as the 
subject of legal science is the exception : in this case, naturally, the attitude 
of the states concerning the birth of the agreement or customary law rule 
is the subject of research.
In contrast, the theory of international relations starts out from the 
activity of the actors in the international arena. I t presumes that this 
activity contains regularly re-occurring elements : grasping these it wants 
to recognize and deduce the regularities. While the science of international 
law asks: is the behavior in accordance with the legal regulation, the theory 
of international relations asks: can any regularity be deduced from the acti­
vity?
A further difference between the two scientific branches is that the 
theoiy of international relations uses a number of categories — concerning 
primary reality although not tangibly present — which are not used by 
international legal science. Let us think about the terms „interest“, 
„power1.1, „aspiration“, „value“ and „motivation“. The differences in the 
approach to primary reality lead us to the comparison of the applied 
method.
III. The method
The method refers to various things. Its first obvious meaning is: 
research technique. In this sphere, there is an enormous difference between 
the two scientific branches.8 While the theory of international relations, 
at least since the appearance of the scientists, has applied the broad scale 
of empiric research techniques9 in addition to the conventional hermeneutic 
and historic-dialectic approaches, the process and means of argumentation 
and proof do not differ from those of one hundred and fifty years ago in 
90% of contemporary international legal literature. The most frequently 
applied method continues to be the category analysis. This is supplemented 
by reference to respected authors and respected judicial judgements.
The second meaning of the „method“ covers more complicated things 
and refers to the approach to reality. In its every trend, the theory of 
international relations strives to describe and to systematize what it 
regards as reality. It is imaginable that a presumed connection proves not 
to pass the test of erudition, but — ignoring now the case of models — 
the theory of international relations always grasps primary reality. I t
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either generalizes from reality with the help of induction or reaches that 
through deduction. The science for international law — determined by 
the nature of international law — relies on fictions, it is composed from 
„as if“ structures, namely, it takes something as a given fact although it 
knows it does not exist, or does not exist in such a way as the science puts it.
Let us see the most characteristic fictions!
The main one is which claims: the states are legally fully independent 
and sovereign. Every international jurist clearly sees the system of inter­
dependence as well as the fact that the sovereign power of a government 
is far from being limitless over its territory and population. Nevertheless, 
law and legal science handles the states as if they could decide on their 
international relations, free from influence at any moment.
The second outstandingly important „as if“ results from this. The 
science of international law regards the states as subjects, as single units 
making rational decisions. It was in vain that the theory of international 
relations illustrated that the state decision is not always rational, even 
using its own declared aims as a measure, and revealed that the leading 
bodies of a state also make contradictory decisions — the science of inter­
national law continues to keep in mind the image of a state that is consis­
tent, trustworthy, foresighted, and circumspect, and avoids potential 
contradiction between its different decisions.10
The third major „as if“ derives from the confusion of norm and reality. 
Legal science writes about the rules as if they were obeyed in life, as if 
the stipulations of the law would materialize in the relationships between 
states. Several thousand pages deal with the military sanctions and its 
conditions, etc., applicable against the aggressor state, decided by the 
UN Security Council. But the regular units — not the blue helmeted 
peace-keeping forces — through which the sanctions should be applied 
never existed because of the controversies of the major powers, despite the 
stipulations of the UN Charter. In a similar manner, the prohibition of the 
use of force and of all types of aggression, is an evergreen topic in legal 
science. This is the case when laymen usually lose their patience, saying 
what hypocrisy it is to deliberate about the banning of all types of aggres­
sion after 1945, under the shadow of 200 wars. Such a temper by the 
outstander is not well founded, not only because it is not willing to take 
into consideration the „as if“ method of legal science, but also because it 
loses sight of the value-constitutive function of the science of international 
law. Value constitution is one of the functions of the science of international 
law, which is worthy of being observed within the full circles of the func­
tions.
IV. Functions
When surveying the functions, fulfilled by the theory of international 
relations and the science of international law, the starting point should 
be that statements that in general outline the functions of the sciences, 
including the social sciences, refer to both disciplines — provided that we
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accept the scientific character of these two fields. Thus, one can say that 
both embody the particular method of cognizance, and they are the creators 
and transmitters of systematized and accumulated knowledge, etc. 
However, it is more important to emphasize those functions, which highlight 
the connections and differences of these two fields.
I t  is very difficult tracing the particular functions of the science of 
international law. The first source of concern is the fact that international 
legal jurisprudence refers to international law, nourishes it and feeds 
from it. The danger exists that the functions of law become mixed up with the 
functions of legal science. The danger is increased by the wellknown pheno­
menon that the scholar of international law frequently acts as a lawyer 
in state employment, which raises the question: can the function of a social 
science be separated from the functions fulfilled by its scholars?
To illustrate the interwovenness, think of two African states on the 
Mediterranean coast which cannot agree how to delimit their continental 
shelf, rich in oil. They decide to take the case to the 15 judges of the Inter­
national Court of Justice in The Hague. In this case, both African countries 
employ well-known international legal experts from developed Western 
countries, in addition to their own diplomats, naval and international 
legal experts. After the clashing of arguments and counter-arguments for 
years, the Court will deliver a judgement in which it does not accept the 
standpoint of either party, but passes judgement in a third manner about 
the delimitation of the continental shelves. (Some of the judges may 
not agree with the judgement of the Court and expound this in an indi­
vidual opinion.) After issuing the judgement, the scientific public opinion 
from Minnesota through Moscow to Manila will publish a multitude of 
professional articles expounding why the standpoint of one or the other 
party and/or the judgement of the Court is incorrect.
The representative of the state is a scholar, so is the judge and the 
commentator. Which represents — and practices — the science and fulfils 
the functions of science? Let us not give a hasty answer, because perhaps 
there is none. For there is a snag: it is doubtful whether the dispute of the 
states has an unambiguous legal solution, which the science should recog­
nize. If a sole correct legal solution exists, then that one will be the practi­
tioner of the functions of science who plays a decisive role in finding it — 
in “recognizing the tru th”. However, it seems there is no sole correct 
legal solution. There is no guarantee that another 15 judges would reach 
the same decision in the same case. (Its the law unambiguous at all, if 
8 from the acting judges approve and 7 disapprove a judgement?)
From the fact that the science of international law has no subject, 
which could be grasped with true or false statements, one can draw two 
conslusions:
— either that the science of international law is no science,
— or that the unbiased cognizance of the rules of international law 
and the solutions derived from them concerning the concrete 
situations, does not belong to its tasks. This means that the science
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of international law is a type of science whose function is not the 
expression of true statements (knowledge).
The source of difficulty here is unambiguously the existence and state 
of international law. If we cast a side glance onto the theory of international 
relations, it immediately becomes conspicuous that the theory of inter­
national relations does not have to take the trouble over some system of 
rules or political norms. I t can directly step to primary reality, to the 
actors in international relations and to their system of relations. In contrast 
to international law, no doubt emerges in the theory of international 
relations concerning the existence of the examined subject.
On the other hand, with regard to international law, it may be doubtful
— whether there is a rule
— what is formulated by the rule
— how a concrete case has to be solved, if the rules are given.
All these require that we should accept at least the above mentioned 
second conclusion11 and instead (beside?) the cognizance of the only and 
true legal judgement valid for disputed situations, we should search somew­
here else for the functions of the science of international law.
The functions of the science of international law spring from the 
relationship to law and can be separated into three groups:
— connected with the creation of law
— connected with a set of norms observed in themselves detached 
from concrete situations
— connected with the application of the law.
In the creation of law the science of international law has several 
roles. One is when it drafts norms opposing the existing legal rules. For 
example, in the 1950s international legal jurisprudence declared coloni­
zation illegal or in the 1970s elaborated the requirement of a new inter­
national economic order. In such cases, legal science can serve the interests 
of a country or a group of countries, which wish to take a new (more 
significant) position in international relations. In certain situations — for 
example, concerning the rules about the utilization of outer space or in 
connection with the protection of the environment — the science of inter­
national law can make itself independent from concrete and topical state 
interests, and with the interests of a larger community, for example, of 
humanity and the future generations in mind, it formulates what rules 
it regards as desirable.
The other role played in the creation of law is more prosaic and it is 
doubtful whether it still means the functioning of science. This is the case 
when the scholar of international law participates as the representative 
of his state in the wording of a bilateral or multilateral agreement. In such 
a case, the formula is unambiguous: his task is to promote the shaping of 
the political will into law; the scholar serves his country and its interests 
and not the science. Naturally, he has a retroaction onto the political will, 
because he will be the one who effectuates the particularities of law against 
the ideas of those who practice political power.
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The role of the third type is the one when the science of international 
law declares the birth of a rule of customary law. The maturing of 
the rule of customary law is a long process, abounding in riddles and 
doubts. The confirmation of its completion and the description of the 
content of the customary law rule requires great expertise, not to mention 
initiatedness which is only possessed by the scholar of international law. 
In  this role, science can operate in an impartial manner or as a servant — 
this is exactly why it could not be fitted into the previous two.
In connection with existing international law, the main function of 
the international legal jurisprudence is to expound the content of rules 
formulated in treaties, in customary law and in the principles. The essence 
of the norm, the conduct to be realized can hardly ever be read out from 
one or two provisions of the treaty. The content of any rule or expression 
can only be discovered after lengthy comparisons and a series of differenti­
ations, following the comparison of the rule and ist context. In addition, 
the customary process of legal science is not that it turns a rule into a prob­
lem and then carries out the above, but the other way round, it takes an 
entirety of phenomena from life, formulates it as a problem, and then looks 
for the applicable rules.
When establishing the meaning of a rule, the international legal juris­
prudence becomes confronted with questions that refer to itself as a science, 
to the permissible forms and methods of the conclusions.12
The result is that the science of international law gives a new definite 
shape to connections, which were already — although concealed — included 
in the rules of international law, and in the system of these rules. During 
this international legal jurisprudence has a more complicated function than 
the theory of international relations. While international relations theory 
has to span the difference between amorphous primary reality and sys­
tematized scientific reflection, the science of international law struggles 
between three poles: reality, legal reflection and scientific reflection. (If the 
attraction of reality is stronger: it becomes sociological, if the attraction 
of the legal material is stronger: it turns positivist.)
Take the example of agression. In answer to the question, what is 
qualified as aggression, the theory of international relations compares the 
categories and the facts (and either deduces or induces), however, in addi­
tion to these two, legal science is also compelled to analyze the relevant 
norms and in this respect it has a clearly distinguishable function. 
Naturally, an infinite line of questions about the function emerges, for 
now' we can raise the question: w hat is the function of the law' interpreting- 
analyzing function? In order to avoid the vicious circle of argumentation 
and platitudes, let us concentrate on the following element of the answer 
chain concerning the functions, by fixing that the analysis and inter­
pretation of law aims at influencing the application of the law through 
certain transmissions.13
What is the function of the science of international law in the appli­
cation of the law — that is in legal practice? The application of the law should 
be broadly conceived, so that it should include not only jurisdiction
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— namely, the solution of concrete disputes based on the law — but all 
those situations in which an international entity, primarily the state deci­
des whether it should act in accordance with the law or in a manner that 
violates the effective international law.
In this connection — with rough simplification — the scholar of 
international law can undertake two types of assignment:
— prior to the decision or following it, he announces whether the 
planned action is in accordance or in contradicition to the law, and what 
legal consequences will or may follow according to the scientific analysis 
of the law;
— following the decision he offers arguments for the use of the decision 
maker supporting or alleging the legality of the given decision.
These two roles remind us of the role of the judge, the commentator 
and the representatives of the parties in our earlier example. The judge 
and the commentator pass judgement on the concrete state decision, 
from the standpoint of the legal system as a whole, namely, of the inter­
national law as an objectivation developing from the encounter of various 
wills, but becoming independent from them. The scholar who makes 
up an ideology for the state deed, and the representative in the conti­
nental shelf example uses the arguments, ensured by legal science, for the 
legitimization of the state steps thereby functioning as means to promote 
the interests of the particular state. The previous function will be regarded 
as scientific by the majority of the science sociologists and the latter by the 
minority.
At this point, the process of thought reached the role of (value) 
measure of legal science. However, discussing it separately in the next 
chapter, let us return from the role of the scholar to science itself as a 
social process! I t is a trivial but significant function of the science of 
international law to promote the application of international law, and to 
support international law in fulfilling its functions. (This can hardly 
be said about every science. Let us think about physics, or the science of 
history. The previous does not promote gravitation and the latter does 
not support the events.)
One should only answer the question what are the functions of inter­
national law? Regrettably, the science of international law is unable to 
provide an answer which would reflect consensus. Every scholar provides 
an individual list of functions.14 There is no concord, because the appro­
priate level of approach cannot be clarified, because the conceptual fra­
mework, the paradigm within which the functions should be described 
cannot be provided. Some apply a history-philosophical framework, others 
use systems-tehoretical, still others work with normativist-descriptive 
tools, not to speak about the purely ideological statements about the 
functions of international law. Most of the thinkers reach an eclectic 
result. Here we should satisfy ourselves with a very general approach. Let 
us conceptualize the processes between the states and other entities of 
international law as communication. In the communicational scheme, 
a language is needed in which the parties formulate their messages, or in
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this model: their requirements and the responses to them, or their offer 
of cooperation and its acceptance. Thus, international law appears as a 
language from the components of which the states build their messages to 
other states. They do not say: “I do not like if laser weapons are deployed 
in outer space”, but they say: “The 1967 Space Treaty prohibits the 
military use of outer space”. The message is the same, the language is 
different, and the situation is also somewhat different. One does not have 
to react to undefined political-power efforts, but to announcements 
outlined with sharp contours, which at the same time, define the limits 
of demand thus limiting the dispute to controllable size. The science of 
international law comes into this scheme in such a way that the science 
helps international law to function as a language: it creates and interprets 
the “words” of the language, the legal stipulations and their connections, 
namely, the legal system. It also contributes to the decoding of the messa­
ges by individual states and other entities of international law, namely, 
to the interpretation of their claims and actions.
Comparing the functions of the science of international law to those 
of the international relations theory one has to stress that international 
relations have not got their own objectivized system of norms, similar to 
international law, therefore, the theory of international relations cannot 
play a similar role to the science of international law. This is particularly 
conspicuous in our next topic, the value evaluation.
V. Value —Value Evaluation
It is a justified requirement that when writing about value it should 
be expressed what the author regards as value, However .this remains 
unsatisfied in this essay because I do not know of any value definition with 
which I would agree without reservation. In fact, definition is not the 
main thing. I t schould be sufficient that below — depending on the con­
text — I will either speak about “objective” value (as for example huma­
nism is usually conceived, or the accomplishment of the categories which 
express it)15 or about subjective value notions, about a target preferred 
by the individual or social group, about a principle or something similar 
that appears as value.
Out of several possible evaluating relations let us concentrate on the 
following:
a) The two scientific branches can evaluate each other or themselves;
b) The scholar of international law and the scholar of the theory 
of international relations can evaluate international law or the 
actual behavior of states.
ad a) Bringing the protected values onto the surface or the demonst­
ration of the evaluation presumptions, materialize during the struggle of 
schools. Let us think about the great dispute of the traditionalists and 
the “scientists” or the efforts in international law aimed at disclosing 
the genuine value preferences of the Myres McDougal school.16 If we
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want to grasp the situation in general announcements, it can be said 
that the theory of international relations is much more conscious in 
searching and pronouncing its value choices -  and its own worth -  
than the science of international law. In the science of international 
law, legal positivism locks most research away from the evaluating 
approach. Only the above mentioned policy-orientated school of McDougal 
and the new natural law thinking are exceptions.
The image of the two scientific branches created about each other 
is the following: the theory of international relations hardly takes notice 
of the science of international law. In a similar manner, the mainstream 
of the science of international law ignores the existence of the theory of 
international relations in an aristocratic maimer. However, the marginal 
trends within the international legal thinking apperceive the effects of 
one or the other school with unconditional enthusiasm.
ad b) The real value problem comes at this point. The scholar of 
international law — using his own personal value order as a measure -  
can evaluate two separate things: international law and the behavior of stales. 
When he criticises the prevailing international law and demands something 
better instead — for example, a new international economic order instead 
of the existing one — then with more or less openness, he confronts his 
own subjective value order — which naturally could be the common 
value household of an entire social stratum or even of an entire nation — 
with the values objectivized in international law. The most difficult 
scientific problem occurs when the scholar of international law evaluates the 
behavior of a state and decides whether the act of the state was “correct” 
or “incorrect” . For it seems obvious that in this evaluation he can only 
use a single measure: international law itself. If the state adhered to the 
law — it was correct, if not — it was incorrect, acting against the values. 
Obeying the law and violating the law concerns two aspects of value. 
One is the value mounted in legal norms. (E. g. sovereignty and everything 
which can be accomplished through it.) The other is the obedience to law 
as a value. The respect for the law is necessary for the operation of the law, 
therefore, the act of obedience to the law in itself — independently from 
which rule it concerns — is a type of (formal) value.
Therefore, the legal scholar finds himself in a very difficult situation, 
when he wants to encourage the state to violate the law — and through 
this to launch a painful process leading to the formation of a new legal 
regulation. In fact, he has to attack two values. In addition, the legal 
scholar cannot doubt one of them — the value of obedience to law — bona 
fide. However, if he renounces to refute a part of the prevailing legal 
order, then he unavoidably becomes conservative, for he defends the old, 
the existing one against the future one. This is characteristic of a large 
part of the science of international law.
In this train of thought, the next legical question is: what values 
does internatiorud law carry that are used by the majority of legal scholars 
as a means in the evaluation of the behavior of stales? Is it wrong if somebody 
is conservative — we can ask. Can the legal scholar allow himself anything
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else?17 Reformism (not to speak about revolutionism) unavoidably attacks 
the prevailing law and the values embodied in them. Hence, what values 
does existing international law prefer?
Let us now disregard regional law, which only embraces countries 
of identical socio-political order, and let us concentrate on universal 
international law, which is equally obligatory for the capitalist, socialist 
and developing states!
László Valki demonstrated that the basic norms of universal inter­
national law “in fact defend the prevailing status quo”. This means that 
from the point of view of the fundamental social controversies they are 
fully neutral.18 Otherwise, they certainly do protect values, such as inde- 
pedence to be granted to colonial peoples, the unconditional prohibition 
of war or respect for human rights.19 Nevertheless, the present inter­
national law after the decolonization primarily entrenches sovereignty. 
The prohibition of aggression, (the principles of non intervention and 
sovereign equality of states) all sanctify an international system construc­
ted from independent, separate nation-states. It protects the political 
system of the states, notwithstanding whether it is conservative, social- 
democratic, or socialist.
Does international law protect values when it reflects and perpetuates 
the world segmented into states? Those who see in this the protection of 
the status cpio, the preservation of peace and the avoidance of armed 
conflicts generated by the anarchy or by the ideological opposition will 
answer with a yes. However, those who see this as the guarantee of the 
structural superiority of the centre over the periphery will answer 
with a no.20 Therefore, it is worth considering whether international law 
could function as the only measure of value by which the behaviour of 
states should be evaluated. This is particularly so in the light of the 
frequent criticism of the scholars in the developing countries. According 
to them, present general international law gives preference to the values 
of capitalist European civilisation over the culture of the developing 
countries, which is frequently of non-European origin, and also not uncon­
ditionally based on the principle of private property and individuality.21
This is the point when in the decision, whether international law 
is valuable (worthy), thus applicable as the measure of state behavior 
or not valuable, thus in the given case it should be shelved, the seemingly 
objective question will necessarily have a reply rooted in subjectivism. 
Therefore, we should stop here and outline what is factual, leaving every­
body the opportunity to pass his own judgement.
The fact is that present universal international law basically protects 
a traditional structure. With slight restrictions, it ensures full powers for 
the state in its domestic affairs and organises inter-state relations according 
to the ideas of formal equality.
This formal equality is no less suitable to cover material inequality 
as is equality before the law within any society.
A last remark is needed here, spotlighting the difference in the evalu­
ating situation of the scholars of international law and of international
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relations. The scholar of international law has the objectivized international 
law as the value measure in the judgement of the states’ behavior at his 
disposal. The scholar of law can cast away this measure if the is obliged 
by his subjective value choices. He can also keep it, led either by his 
belief in the values carried by the actual legal material or by legal con­
formism. The scholar of international relations has no souch value measu­
ring means. Consequently, in evaluating the actions of states, he can only 
rely on his own value order. Thus, while the scholar of law can hold onto 
the law, if he does not want to immediately rely on his own subjectivity, 
the international relations scientist has no other starting point than his 
individual value order.
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Zusammenfassung
Die Studie vergleicht die Völkerrechts Wissenschaft m it der Theorie dei internationalen 
Beziehungen, um  ihre Verschiedenheiten in Gegenstand, in den Methoden, in der Funktion
und in der wert messende Rolle betreffend zu zeigen.
Im  Gegenstand der zwei Wissenschaftszweige gibt es einen bedeutenden Unterschied 
in der Größe der Aufmerksamkeit, die den supra- und  subnationalen Teilnehmern gewidmet 
wird. Was die Methode betrifft, ist der Traditionalism us der Völkerreohtslehre aulfallend. 
Die Ursache der Unterschiede in den Funktionen ist selbst das Völkerrecht: m it solchen 
Normensystemen braucht sieh die Theorie der internationalen Beziehungen nicht zu be­
schäftigen. Gerade die Existenz der Rechtsnorm en ist die Ursache der Verschiedenheiten in 
der W ertm essung: der Völkerrechtswissenschaftler kann -  wenn er will -  das R echt als 
W ertm aß benützen, aber der E xperte der internationalen Beziehungen kann sich nur auf 
sein persönliches U rteil stützen.
РЕЗЮ М Е
Настоящая работа сопоставляет науку международного права с теорией 
международных связей, чтобы показать их различие в предмете, методе, функции 
и в оценочной роли.
В предмете этих научных областей существует значительная разница в том, 
какое внимание уделяется суб-исупрананпоналыгым участникам. В связи с методом 
очевиден традиционализм науки международного права. Источником разницы 
в функциях является международное право. Такими системами норм меория между­
народных связей не должна заниматься. Именно существование правовых норм 
является причиной разницы в оценке: ученый международного права может -  
если хочет -  употреблять право как измеритель ценности, а специалист между­
народных связей может опираться только на свою оценку.
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